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Privacy, Publication, and the First
Amendment: The Dangers of First
Amendment Exceptionalism
Richard A. Epstein*
The coordinationof common law and constitutionalnorms are ofpressing
importance on matters offreedom of speech. In the Supreme Court and elsewhere, it is possible to discern two sharply inconsistent attitudes toward this
question. One view holds that the FirstAmendment simply prevents any legislative backslidingfrom the common law rules that protectfreedom of speech
and of the press, much as they protectfreedom of contract andfreedom of action generally. On this view, the standardrule governingdamages and injunctive relief apply to speech much as they do anywhere else. On the alternative
view of what is termed First Amendment exceptionalism, the FirstAmendment
protection is read more broadly to afford speech greaterprotection than the
common law rules that insulate the publication ofstolen informationfrom judicialsanction by eitherdamages or injunction. The articlethen argues that the
common law approachaffords a better balancebetween privacy and disclosure
with respect to a wide range of confidential information, including the protection oftrade secrets. In so doing,it criticizes the results reached in a number of
Important recent cases including Desnick v. American Broadcasting Co., Food
Lion v. Capital Cities/ABC, and Ford Motor Co. v. Lane.
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INTRODUCTION: ANYTHING NEW IN CYBERSPACE?

Doctrinal analysis often requires us to reconcile traditional legal principle with modem technological innovation. Nowhere is this task of reconciliation more daunting than with cyberspace, where the speed and spread of
information has been ratcheted up to levels that were unimaginable even a
generation ago. And nowhere in cyberspace is it more important to tweak
doctrine than on the general legal issue of privacy, which is here defined as
the ability of individuals to keep private-that is, subject to limited distribution for specific persons-information about themselves that could prove
harmful or embarrassing to them if made public or placed in the wrong
hands. The speed, for example, with which medical records can be transmitted from one person to another has spawned a wide set of (misguided)
federal guidelines on the use and dissemination of this information.'
That said, however, there is a second danger that is, if anything, greater
than the first: endowing the new challenges in cyberspace with such novelty
that it becomes too easy to forget that the underlying problems have been
with us for a very long time.2 Just as with the rise of the camera and the

parabolic microphone, the law must resolve a permanent tension between
two ideals, each of which seems to be unexceptional until placed in juxtaposition to the other. The first ideal of privacy carries with it all the positive

connotations of allowing individuals to control information about themselves. The second ideal is full disclosure of that same information to allow

others to make full and informed decisions. Unfortunately, both ideals cannot be fully honored at the same time, and someone has to choose between
them in many different contexts.

This clash of imperatives, moreover, long predates eyberspace: Individuals have always wanted to keep information about themselves private
1. For all the relevant information, see Dep't. of Health &Hum. Serv., Administrative Simplification <http://aspe.hs.govladmnsimp>. The most obvious concern about these regulations, their
ostensible concern for administrative simplification notwithstanding, is their enormous compliance
costs, which will ripple through the system. There has been, of course, an evident concern with the
privacy of medical records. But by the same token, there has been a lack of appreciation of the
multiple purposes to which these are put and of their need to deal not only with patient treatment,
but also with coverage and insurance issues and matters of medical research. The nondisclosure of
medical records to the proper source is of equal concern, and HHS has not introduced evidence to
suggest any systematic breakdown in the current system that would require the massive intervention
of its current detailed regulations. So long as the patient and medical care provider are in privity
with each other (or are connected by intermediates) the case for government regulation rests on a
breakdown in current practices that is not demonstrated here. And the heavy criminal sanctions that
are imposed under section 1177, allowing for fines up to $50,000 and imprisonment for a year for a
single wrongful disclosure strike me as excessive.
2. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 (1998)
(making the basic case with specific reference to jurisdictional questions). For my own earlier
defense of this position, see Richard A. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Connon Law, 9
LEGAL STUD. 253 (1980).
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while finding out everything about others. Information is power, whether it
is the information that you possess or that which you can deny to others.
That said, the desires for privacy and disclosure cannot be satisfied for all
people simultaneously. The challenge therefore is to examine the larger
question in more specific contexts to determine the relative values of privacy
and full disclosure.
The rise of cyberspace did not create this tension, but it does exacerbate
it. A similar set of difficulties arose with the camera and the parabolic microphone. 3 Much the same may be said about mass publication, which got
its first boost with the Gutenberg printing press. The ability to broadcast online has increased the scope of publication mightily, but it is far less clear
that our contemporary problems have altered materially as we have moved
beyond traditional print and broadcast media. One recent question of some
import concerns the liability of Internet operators for defamatory messages
posted on their systems by others. The Communications Decency Act4 provides these web page operators with absolute immunity.5 The obvious points
here are, first, that the plaintiffs preferred defamation action should be directed against the party who posted the message, assuming that she can find
him; next, that it becomes virtually impossible to ask the proprietor of the
network to maintain a constant surveillance of the content posted on various
sites by a wide range of subscribers, some of whom are certain to hold extreme, malevolent, or outlandish views. But that said, how different is the
problem here from an attempt to hold a newspaper responsible for the content of personal advertisements, or a lending library responsible for the contents of the books it sends into circulation, or a broadcast station for the
defamation of one of its guests? 6 In each case the question is whether the
system of vicarious liability makes sense by pressing into service those individuals who have only an imperfect ability to identify the defamation and to
contain the damage it causes, given that they may be in a better position to
forestall the harm than the plaintiff.
The same set of conflicts arises with the issue that I wish to examine
here, which is the extent to which a plaintiff can recover publication damages
for truthful information that has been wrongfully obtained. In some cases the
publication in question is made by the broadcast media. In other cases it is
3. Apprehension over the new technology was voiced, for example, in Samuel D. Warren &
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890) ('Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and
numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the
closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops."). For an early decision that imposed liability on
the use of listening devices, see Roach v. Harper,105 S.E.2d 564 (W. Va. 1958).
4. Communications Decency Act of 1996,47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996).
5. See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); Blumenthal v. Drudge,
992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
6. For the traditional privilege, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 581 (1977).
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made over the web. In the former case, we are sure that the publication
comes from the press. In the latter case, it is not clear whether that honorific
designation should be given to anyone with access to a website-it is unmistakable that the line between media and nonmedia defendants will break
down with the advent of desktop publication. But either way the legal issues
raised require a close analysis of the interaction between common law and
constitutional principles.
The key question is one of deceptive simplicity but enormous impact:
May a private plaintiff recover damages from, or obtain an injunction
against, a defendant that openly publishes truthful information about the
plaintiff, when the defendant has wrongfully acquired that information? The
recent cases that have addressed this question have primarily answered it in
the negative, citing the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech
and, with respect to the question of injunctive relief, its general prohibition
against prior restraints of publication. I have worked somewhat extensively
on this matter as a practicing lawyer, having been involved in both the Food
Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. case, 7 where the broadcast was on

PrimeTime Live, and the Ford Motor Co. v. Lane case,5 where publication
was on the web. I hope in this paper to navigate the shoals of common law
and First Amendment law to explain why, in this context, the latter does not
place any constraint on the orderly evolution of the former doctrine, either
before or after the advent of cyberspace. On this problem, as with so many
others, the advent of cyberspace may raise the stakes, but it hardly follows
that it also changes the correct solutions.
To successfully examine this topic, it is necessary to understand the fundamentals of both the common law and First Amendment issues involved. It
is also necessary to be aware of the risks that are imposed by what I call
"First Amendment exceptionalism," that is, the belief that the First Amendment weights the scales above and beyond what a sensible theory of freedom
of speech, understood as part of a general theory of freedom, would require.
Viewed from an ideal perspective, common law and constitutional law ought
to mesh so that the routine enforcement of common law obligations does not
violate constitutional norms. After all, at its root, the common law remains a
largely libertarian system that accords the freedom of speech, like the freedom of contract, presumptive validity so that a plaintiff must offer some
good reason why speech should be restrained or sanctioned. It is not as
though the two systems differ because they appeal at root to different philosophical principles. The difference comes in the way in which these principles are understood and applied.
7. 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999) (concerning broadcast of undercover television investigation
of grocery store chain).
8. Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp.2d 745 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (concerning posting of
copyrighted material and misappropriated trade secrets on the web).
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Early on in our history, there was little tension between common law and
constitutional principles. But with the rise of First Amendment jurisprudence, that tension started to emerge, and it reached fruition with the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.9 Today the
conflicts between the treatment of speech at common law and under the First
Amendment have become more explicit and acute, so that it is no longer safe
to assume any close coincidence between them. Rather, we have a persistent
constitutional dualism in which courts first adopt and then reject First
Amendment exceptionalism as their interpretative guide.10 The basic task,
then, is to find some general theory to arbitrate which set of free speech principles should hold sway and why. In articulating that theory, it is of course
necessary do more than repeat the truism that constitutional law stands at the
top of the legal pecking order, while common law stands at its bottom, with
legislation sandwiched somewhere in between. The point here is not that
constitutional law rules, especially insofar as they relate to the articulation
and defense of individual rights, bear a closer resemblance to common law
rules than to the legislation that often supplants them; both are judge-made
rules that necessarily lack the administrative backbone and dense texture that
only legislation, whether for wise or for ill, can provide. Rather, the nub of
the problem is that the two bodies of judge-made law start from different
substantive visions about their common subject matter.
In order to approach the relationship between common law and constitutional law more systematically, Part I of this article explores the relationship
between the torts of defamation and invasion of privacy, and explains the
critical role that the issue of truth-itself a battlefield of contention-has
played in developing the basic rules for publication damages in the two torts.
Part H then seeks to explain what corrections, under the rubric of privilege,
should be made to the laws governing defamation and invasion of privacy,
both by insulating certain false statements from liability and by imposing
liability for certain true statements. Part Ill then examines cases that allow
anyone, including media defendants, to publish true information that has
been wrongfully obtained. These cases include the following alternative arguments: The publication of this information should not count as a cognizable harm; or if the harm is cognizable, the publication is nonetheless
justified; or if the publication is not justified, the publication is too remote
from the original wrongful acquisition of the information. Part IV then looks
at First Amendment exceptionalism in action, by examining the distinctive
9. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
10. As examples of First Amendment exceptionalism, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964) and Pearsonv. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (holding that it is a defense to invasion of privacy that published material was of public interest). For the opposite approach, see Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (holding that First Amendment does
not protect publisher from damages suit for revealing confidential source).
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constitutional justifications for denying legal redress for publication damages. In so doing, it explores the strength and limitations of the effort in
Cohen v. Cowlesi to insulate any "generally applicable law" from First
Amendment scrutiny so long as its effects on speech are only "incidental."
Part V examines the tension between the common law practice of affording
injunctive relief and the First Amendment prohibition against prior restraints.
Finally, Part VI extends the analysis to an important form of privacy interest:
trade secrets. Although the particular question-the relief, if any, a plaintiff
may recover for publication damages-looks narrow, the principles that must
be resolved to answer it correctly are fully applicable to the full range of privacy issues, not only with traditional modes of publication, but also, as was
the case in the Ford setting,.with modem Internet communications. A brief
conclusion follows.
I. FROM DEFAMATION TO PRIVACY iN ONE LARGE LEAP
For most of our constitutional history it was difficult to detect any real
tension between the common law principle of defamation (and, one may add,
privacy) and the First Amendment. The usual reconciliation of the two principles was that the law of defamation was concerned with false speech to the
discredit of the plaintiff, which, being wrongful, received no constitutional
protection at all. The first apparent confrontation between common and constitutional law took place in Near v. Minnesota,12 where the issue was
whether the state could enjoin a libel on the ground that it was a "public nuisance" for which abatement was an appropriate remedy. Here the Court relied explicitly on Blackstone's statement that "[t]he liberty of the press is
indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no
previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for
criminal matter when published."13 Indeed Near was prepared to follow an
unbroken history of not attempting to silence the press before speech precisely because "[p]ublic officers, whose character and conduct remain open
to debate and free discussion in the press, find their remedies for false accusations in actions under libel laws providing for redress and punishment, and
not in proceedings to restrain the publication of newspapers and periodicals."14 The state need not supplement common law tort actions with statutory remedies because the common law itself provided an adequate damage
11. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
12. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
13. Id. at 713 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151-52). The Court con-

tinues: "Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public;
to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous or illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity." Id. at 713-14 (quoting 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *152).

14. Near, 283 U.S. at 718-19.
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remedy after the fact. At that point, it was acceptable to give the writer or
speaker the choice whether to publish and risk the libel, to alter the message,
or to remain silent. The system in effect imposed a damage filter whose incentive effect was to prevent defamatory speech, at the cost (since there is
always a cost) of deterring speech that could be mistakenly branded as libel.
Near read the Constitution to track the common law on the choice of remedies insofar as it blocked any anticipatory restraints on speech, even restraints that were only imposed after the speaker is given the opportunity to
demonstrate the truth of his remarks.t5
The initial cleavage between the common law and the First Amendment
grew both broader and became more permanent in New York Times, whose
intimate connection with the civil rights turmoil in the segregated South is in
danger of being forgotten today. In New York Times, none of the Justices of
the Supreme Court were prepared to allow the state judges to impose whatever damages they chose for ordinary defamation of public officials. At this
juncture, the difference between the idealized common law and the common
law of any particular state becomes critical, for the entire system of constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech could easily be undone by judges
who were gunning for a particular defendant, as was surely the case in the
Alabama courts. It did not follow, of course, that the Court had to hold that
all state remedies for defamation of public officials (later extended to public
figures) 6 were precluded by the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
speech, even though that absolutist position was championed by Justices
Black and Douglas. Defamation necessarily involves false statements of fact
to the discredit of other individuals.17 Where these statements were made
deliberately, or, in what has long been treated in the same fashion, with
reckless disregard of their truth or falsity,18 then the defamation in question
rises, to be blunt, to a lie that falls within the core libertarian prohibition
against the use of force or fraud. Such lies would be the source of remedies
to those parties who rely on them to their detriment, as by an ordinary action
of deceit.
Unless the Supreme Court wants to sanction wholesale fraud, it becomes
hard to explain why deliberate false statements should be treated as legally
15. See id. at720-21.
16. See Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
17. "A communication is defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to
lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing
with him." RESTATNEMNT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 559 (1977). The point of this definition is twofold. The general reference to lowered estimation in the community sets up the case for general
damages; the reference to deterring specific individuals from associating or dealing with the plaintiff sets up the case for showing special damages, as in the loss of a particularjob. We know that
the statements must be false because truth is an absolute defense in defamation cases. For discus-

sion, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS, Ch. 18 (1999).
18. See Derry v. Peek, 14 App. Cas. 337 (H.L. 1889).
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benign when made about the plaintiff instead of being made to her. Indeed,
communications about the plaintiff may prove more dangerous than those
made to her. In the latter setting, the plaintiff can engage in self-defense by
questioning the speaker or by refusing to deal with him. But the plaintiff is
frequently stripped of the ability to engage in self-protection when the defendant makes the communications to third persons who may rationally respond
to bad information by refusing to deal with the plaintiff on the prudential
ground, "better safe than sorry." This reason-the vulnerability to the blindside-helps explain why the common law rules on defamation tended to
adopt strict liability in cases involving false statements about the plaintiff' 9
The question then arises as to whether the law should still cut the defendant some slack in these defamation cases, as did New York Times by creating a constitutional privilege for false statements of fact about public
officials by making the statements actionable only if they met the common
law standard for fraud, that is, they were known to be false or were uttered
with reckless disregard for whether they were true or false. Although that
rule did have some common law support,20 most courts applied the strict liability principle applied to false statements of fact,2 1 even if the defendant
received an absolute privilege to publish his opinions about the defendant's
activities. Here the division of authority at common law shows one latent
difficulty in resolving any differences between the common law rule and the
constitutional law norm. The common law does not speak with a uniform
voice. Yet here I would again take the position, implicit in Nearand adopted
strongly by Justice White,22 that the Constitution does not displace any
common law rule that has stood the test of time. The defense is largely the
pragmatic one that the press in the United States and other common law
countries had flourished under the general rules in force prior to the advent
of New York Times. While the reversal of the Alabama court could easily be
justified on the ground that Alabama played fast and loose with two elements
of the common law account of the wrong-what it means for statements to
19. See, e.g., E. Hulton & Co. v. Jones, [1910] App. Cas. 20 (1909) (holding that defendant is
liable whether or not he intended to defame plaintiff). The other reason is that in most cases the
harmful nature of the defendant's statement is apparent from the words themselves or from the
context in which they were uttered, so that it is not too much to ask the defendant to investigate the
truth of a statement when on notice of its potential for harm. Note that this rationale does not apply
to the few cases of innocent defamation where the harmful context is unknown to the defendant,
such as the announcement of the marriage of a person who is, unbeknownst to the defendant, already married.
20. See, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P.2d 281 (Kan. 1908) (holding that a publisher may
be immune from libel action if it acts in good faith about matters of public concern within the areas
in which it publishes).
21. See, e.g., Post Publ'g Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530 (6th Cir. 1893) (holding that false statements about public figures are actionable).
22. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (taking the
strong position that what worked at common law should not be displaced by constitutional edict, no
matter how carefully crafted).
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be "of and concerning the plaintiff," and what is needed to prove hefty
awards of general damages-the Supreme Court had little reason to fashion a
broad "actual malice" privilege out of whole cloth that would become applicable to all sorts of defamation cases that had none of the tragic overtones of

the civil rights struggle in the South.23
The confluence between common law and constitutional law did, however, make a partial comeback in Gertz,24 where Justice Powell resuscitated
the common law distinction between fact and opinion, holding the latter to be

absolutely protected, even as the former was seen to have-and this point
will become critical for what follows-no intrinsic value.25 Once again his
basic point has strong analytical antecedents. Return again for a moment to
the two-party situation where the distinction between truth and falsity or-

ganizes this entire branch of law. It is one thing to offer a vial of poison to
someone who knows its contents, and it is quite another to offer it to someone who does not. The user's knowledge in the first case severs causal connection; her ignorance in the second case preserves it.26 Just as it is more
difficult to develop theories that hold the supplier of poison responsible for
the death of the party who assumes the risk, so it is more difficult to construct theories that hold people responsible for true speech, which in general

improves public debate, than for false speech, which degrades it. False information leads members of the public to make wrong decisions in both their
personal lives and in their public activities. It therefore becomes highly
problematic, to say the least, to afford false statements any constitutional
protection at all: Should false statements by insiders about traded stocks be
protected even if they degrade the public market in corporate shares? In
those cases, the common law rule of strict liability for false statements of fact
continues to make good sense. 27
The strongest counterargument to the true/false distinction lies in the difficulty of placing various statements on one side of the line or the other.
23. For my defense of this position, see Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan
Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782,792-94 (1986).
24. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339.40 (noting that "[uinder the First Amendment there is no such
thing as a false idea.... But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.").
25. See, e.g., PostPubl'gCo., 59 F. 530; Coleman, 98 P. 281 (taking minority view protecting
false statements of fact); Carr v. Hood, 170 Eng. Rep. 981 (K.B. 1808). For the early law, see generally Dix W. Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates,49 COLUM. L. REV. 875
(1949).
26. Just this line of argument was developed early on in the Lex Aquilia, see Justinian'sDigest, Book IX, title 2, in F.H. LAWSON, NEGLIGENCE IN THE CIVIL LAW (1950), where the progression runs as follows: It is surely a wrong for the defendant to kill (occidere) by forcing poison
down the plaintiffs throat. It is likewise a wrong for the defendant to furnish the plaintiff (causan
mortlispraestare)a cause of death. But that condition only applies when the plaintiff takes in ignorance of the true qualities of the potion. In line with Aristotle, the classical theory of causation
finds that force and mistake negate intervention. For discussion, see EPSTEIN, TORTS, supra note
17, § 10.10.
27. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 369 (White, J., dissenting); Epstein, supranote 23.
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Even so, it hardly follows that the appropriate adjustment is to require plaintiffs to prove defendants' negligence, as Gertz demanded in suits by private
plaintiffs against media defendants. The better strategy seems to be to require plaintiffs to prove falsity-where the common law should have placed
the burden in the first place.28
It is on just this point that the law of privacy becomes difficult where (at
least in principle) the common law of defamation should be easy. The critical question with privacy concerns the publication of information about the
plaintiff that, while wrongfully obtained, is also true. At this point, the nature of the inquiry shifts in the paradigmatic case. It is easy to defend a regime that imposes substantial damages on statements that both harm the
individual plaintiff and have negative effects on third persons. However, it
is much more difficult to decide what remedy, if any, to offer when the defendant's statements harm the plaintiff but have positive effects on third parties. The proper legal rule is one that seeks to net all benefits and costs over
all individuals, and to make suitable adjustments when the direct measurement of the full set of costs and benefits is not possible.
With defamation, the elements of plaintiff and third party harm move in
the same direction. A legal system that compensates the plaintiff for her loss
alone will in effect understate the level of compensation required from a social perspective by ignoring the net harm that defamation imposes on third
persons. This last qualification for net harm is needed to make the argument
work, because ordinarily there is no reason to believe that all third persons
are harmed uniformly by the false information spread by the defendant. To
take a simple illustration, if the defendant disparages the plaintiffs product,
the third party harm is sustained by plaintiffs customers who look elsewhere; however, the plaintiff s competitors probably gain. It is only by virtue of our belief that the system is in equilibrium prior to the defamation that
we assume that the net gains from the current match of customers and suppliers is optimal, so that the deviation brought on by the defendant's defamation causes some social loss. Due to the shifting composition of this third
party pool, it is usually difficult to measure the indirect effects of the defamation. But that informational shortfall is of little consequence so long as
the legal system opts to accept the underdeterrence to avoid the high administrative costs of calculating third party damage and determining to whom the
award should be paid. Indeed, so long as this judgment is made at a highly
general level of abstraction, the practical veil of ignorance protects us from
any sustained distributional challenge to the overall rule. No one in the
veiled state knows whether she is the defamer, the defamed, or a third party
that gains or loses from the defamation. All that is known is the centralizing
28. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (holding that plaintiff
had burden of proving falsity of statements in newspaper that were a matter of public concern).
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tendency of the rule, so that the best the individual can do is to advance her
own interest by advancing the group as a whole, which is what a sensible law
of defamation tries to do.
The calculus of costs and benefits operates in quite a different fashion in
privacy cases, where what is said is true. Now if the law compensates the
plaintiff for her losses when the net external effects are positive, it could
easily deter disclosures that, on balance, should be made. This tension is, in
a sense, easily resolved when the defendant makes true statements from information that has been lawfully obtained. In those cases, the plaintiff is not
able to show any tort at all, so that her losses do not enter into the social calculus. At this point, all that is left standing are the positive social gains that
come from the truthful revelations.29
Here of course there is some equivocation about what counts as a wrong,
given that defamation is ruled out of bounds. It seems that here, as a first
approximation, the answer can be found by returning to standard common
law rules of tort and contract. Information is obtained wrongfully at common law if it is obtained by tortious means or by breach of contract, especially breach of that subclass of contracts known as confidential relations.
The most obvious precedent for this move comes from the early cases of interference with trade; a defendant who shot at pupils who intended to attend
an "antient" school run by the plaintifP0 and a defendant who shot across the
bow of the native boats that were intent on trading with the plaintiffP' were
each held liable. Likewise the tort of inducement of breach of contract was
addressed to wrongs within the general force and fraud framework.32 Only
when the conduct turns out not to be wrongful in either of the tort or breach
of contract sense will the plaintiff face a strong uphill battle to make the defendant's conduct actionable. The situation becomes far more vexed in principle when the actions in question are wrongful in the common law sense,
29. Here, of course, we have the same ambiguities as before with defamation. Some truthful
revelations will hurt, say, the suppliers of a firm now shown to have inferior products, but these
losses are offset by the gains that come from the suppliers of superior products, so that once again
we rely on the assumption that fully informed markets outperform uninformed markets to reach the
conclusion found in the text. Indeed, if the general rule is announced early enough in the process,
no individual will know her place in the overall social order, so that each person, making her most
informed guess as to her own self-interest, will think herself a gainer by the rule of no liability.
Move far enough back in the mists of time, and the distributional issues shrink in importance relative to the overall output consequences. With common law rules, it is generally possible to adopt
that intellectual stance even if the parties to the case have strong positions of their own.
30. See the account found in Keeble v. Hickeringill,103 Eng. Rep. 1127, 1128 (K.B. 1809):
One schoolmaster sets up a new school to the damage of an antient school, and thereby the

scholars are allured from the old school to come to his new. (The action was held there not to
lie.) But suppose Mr. Hickeringill should lie in the way with his guns, and fright the boys
from going to school, and their parents would not let them go thither, sure that schoolmaster
might have an action for the loss of his scholars.
31. See Tarleton v. M'Gawley, 170 Eng. Rep. 153 (N.P. 1793).
32. See, e.g., Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
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such that force, fraud, breach of contract, or the inducement of breach of
contract, is used to obtain the information that leads to the publication of true
information. For here it is necessary to net out private losses against public
gains. The power of this framework is well revealed in the analysis of the
common law cases on the matter.
II. REFINING THE BASIC MODEL

Much of the difficulty in the law of privacy stems, then, from the clear
perception that the line between truth and falsity matters in the law of speech
as much as the line between aggression and other forms of physical behavior
in the law regulating ordinary forms of human actions. This formulation,
however, provides only a first approximation of an ultimately sound set of
results. The key questions are what refinements should be made from that
initial position. At this point, the basic logic is one which asks whether or
not some systematic deviations from the simple truth-falsity baseline work
systematically to improve the long-run average position of all individuals.
The basic model is one that treats every limitation on the common law rights
as a taking of private property, itself a presumptive wrong, and then asks
whether the benefit from the limitation, to the same individuals, leaves them
better off than they were before.33
A. Privilegesfor Defamation
Within the law of defamation, a class of privileges (of which the "justification" of truth is not one) is introduced to protect, absolutely or conditionally, false statements from becoming the source of liability. Within the
private sphere, one common privilege, qualified in nature, protects individuals who make false statements of fact on matters of common interest with
some third party.34 The most usual contexts are employment references and
advice about common business connections. Here the party who seeks the
information normally has strong incentives to filter it for his own selfprotection. Executive level searches frequently involve contacts with multiple references, such that effective institutional safeguards are usually in place
to counter false statements. This privilege, moreover, is typically limited to
those statements made in good faith, so that malicious persons can still be

33. For a general statement of this position, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A
(1995) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES]; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:

COMPLEX WORLD

PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). For its application to privacy

generally, see Richard A. Epstein, DeconstructingPrivacyand Putling it Back TogetherAgain, 17
(No. 2) SOC. PHIL. & POL. 1 (2000).
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 594-96 (1977).
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held liable if their cleverly worded accusations escape detection.35 The
common law provides a set of absolute privileges when the false statements
are made, for example, by judges, prosecutors, lawyers and witnesses as part
of a legal proceeding. 36 Here the ability to respond is guaranteed by the judicial process, and it makes little or no sense to allow the statements made in
the context of one case to be challenged in yet another. It is not that anyone
prizes false statements inside judicial proceedings; indeed, the statements can

be sharply punished by cross-examination, disciplinary actions, or criminal
prosecution for perjury. It is simply that defamation suits do little to improve
the performance of already charged proceedings and are best left to one side.

B. Liabilityfor True Statements
The process of correction also takes place in the other direction, as attempts are often made to impose liability for a limited class of true state-

ments, a prominent illustration of which is embarrassing disclosures of past
facts. 37 The usual situation involves a publication of evidence that the plaintiff has engaged in criminal activities,.3 has been the previous object of scandal,39 or more recently, has concealed a gay identity.40 The imposition of
liability in these cases has always enjoyed, at most, a cramped existence in
the law. In line with the basic presumption, the value of these statements to

third parties must be regarded as positive, so that the social dislocations from
defamation do not arise. A broad newsworthiness privilege,4' which, as of
late, has been accorded a constitutional dimension,42 seems to dominate in
these cases.
35. The rules on malice are set out in Clark v. Molyneux, (1877] 3 Q.B. 237 (1877). For a
further illustration, see I ROBERTD. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 9.3 (3ded. 1995).
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §§ 585-87 (1977).
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
38. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 483 P.2d 34, 40 (Cal. 1971) (finding
cause of action for invasion of privacy when defendant published an account of his conviction 11
years earlier).
39. See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931) (holding that plaintiff had
cause of action for invasion of privacy when defendant filmmakers made a movie about her past as
a prostitute and a murder defendant).
40. See, e.g., Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (finding
no cause of action when newspaper revealed sexual orientation ofplaintiff who thwarted an assassination attempt on President Ford, due to the newsworthiness of the item).
41. See, e.g., Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that the
individual conduct of an unknown plaintiff was newsworthy in light of the subject of defendant's
book); Sidis v. F-R Publ'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940) (holding that the press may violate
the privacy of anyone who is voluntarily or involuntarily a public figure).
42. See Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 1975):
The privilege to publicize newsworthy matters is included in the definition of the tort set out in
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (Tentative Draft No. 21, 1975). Liability may be imposed for an invasion of privacy only if "the matter publicized is of a kind which ... is not of
legitimate concern to the public." while the Restatement does not so emphasize, we are satisHeinOnline -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1015 1999-2000
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Individuals who refuse to do business with someone are exercising,
within the common law tradition, their rights of freedom of association. Any
decision to sanction the publication of this truthful information must find
some special justification in keeping private the information that other individuals value in making their associational decisions. Within the traditional
tort framework, one explanation is the importance of the rehabilitative ideal,
which creates a kind of social statute of limitations on youthful misdeeds.
This policy is expressed in the common practice of expunging youthful
criminal offenses from state records, such that false information is, quite literally, distributed to prospective employers.43 The basic claim is that all of
us (well, nearly all of us) would regard ourselves as better off if we could
keep certain classes of information about ourselves private, such as our
youthful indiscretions, even if we were forced to renounce access to the same
kind of true information about other individuals.
"Let sleeping dogs lie" becomes the dominant theme, but the constitutional uneasiness about this claim stems in large measure from lingering
doubts about the asserted social consensus on this issue. Stated in its most
general form, the trade-off hardly has the same dimensions for all types of
information, and for the particular members of the public to whom it is disclosed. After all, the individual who marries or obtains a job by concealing
past actions has committed a fraud against those people who would refuse to
deal with her if they had known the truth. The rest of the world may well not
care about the past, but the spouse or employer cares a great deal. That person feels betrayed and duped, not solely because of the past actions, but because of the continuing, present efforts at concealment: It is not beyond the
pale of reason to say, "I could have forgiven the youthful misconduct, but I
cannot forgive the cover-up of today."
Yet the topic resists any form of universalization, because of a strong if
inchoate social sense that the prohibition against some disclosures do fit
nicely into the model of mutual renunciation after all. Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn,44 which held that the press had a First Amendment right to
publish the name of a seventeen-year-old rape victim, draws an uneasy response because the claim of a rape victim (who has done nothing wrong) to
keep that matter private resonates well with most of the public (those who
understand her reluctance to relive that event daily when it is examined in
great detail in the newspapers). Today newspapers commonly respect the
fled that this provision is one of constitutional dimension delimiting the scope of the tort and
that the extent of the privilege thus is controlled by federal rather than state law.
43. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-915 (West, WESTLAW through 1999 Sess.)
(Illinois statute governing the expungement of law enforcement and juvenile court records). For an
article criticizing the practice, see T. Markus Funk, 7he Dangers of Hiding Criminal Pasts, 66
TENN. L. REV. 287 (1988).
44. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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victim's right to keep her identity private unless she waives it, even if the
matter itself is one of public record.45 The public that wants to receive certain kinds of information is actually offended once it is provided. But one
might not have the same view about former criminals, for whom the added
disclosure about past wrongs amounts to an effective additional social deterrent against wrongdoing that incurs none of the heavy costs of running the
criminal justice system. Therefore, in dealing with the publication of information, everyone is sensitive to the different types of private information that
people seek to protect. It is no sign of weakness that it is necessary to disaggregate the class of truthful communications in order to sift out those left
better unsaid. It is the sense of variation within this class that makes Justice
White's inflexible First Amendment analysis in Cox so uncomfortable. The
added complexity resulting from a social rule that keeps the names of rape
victims out of the paper without their consent seems very small. The class is
sharply defined and the prohibition detracts little from any larger social discussion of the issue, which is why most newspapers, rightly fearing a reader
backlash, refuse to publish this information until (or perhaps even when) it
becomes common knowledge.

III. COMMON LAW JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PUBLISHING
WRONGFULLY OBTAINED INFORMATION
The case for publication damages, related to the publication of true
speech, becomes much more persuasive when the information was obtained
by illegal means. Here the basic patterns are easy enough to state. One class
of cases, including Food Lion, arises when the defendant sends its employees
to obtain true information about the plaintiff. Rifling through the confidential files of other organizations usually involves a number of actions that fall,
alone or in combination, squarely under the libertarian prohibitions against
force or fraud. Sometimes the transaction involves trespass to land and to
chattels; other times it involves the torts of fraud and conversion. This is to
be expected when the defendant or its agent sneaks onto the premises of another in the dead of night, or assumes false identities and roles, in order to
gain access to the papers and materials that the defendant later broadcasts.
Alternatively, a defendant may breach a personal obligation by disclosing to
the public sensitive information that he received in confidence. No longer is
it necessary to imagine, as in cases involving the disclosure of embarrassing
past events, some hypothetical bargain in which all people mutually re45. See Deborah NV. Denno, Symposium: The PrivacyRights of Rape Victims in the Media

and the Law: Perspectiveson DisclosingRape Victims' Names, 61 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1113 (1993)
(noting the dominant practice not to disclose names). See also Michelle Johnson, Of PublicInterest. How CourtsHandleRape Victims'PrivacySuits, 4 COMM. L. & POL'Y 201 (1999) (noting that
some newspapers continue to publish victims' names).
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nounce their rights to receive true information about others in exchange for
increased personal privacy. Here the illegal actions of the defendant are established under the oldest and least controversial principles of deliberate
fraud, deliberate trespass, and deliberate breach of confidence, or with the
publication of information received with notice of its illegal acquisition. The
question then arises: What kinds of justifications for these actions can the
defendant put forward, either at common law or under the Constitution, to
excuse this behavior?
A. CognizableHarm
The first line of defense speaks to the question of cognizable harm, by
holding that the common law of trespass is not really designed to protect
against future publication damages, but only against the usual forms of
physical destruction and personal unease brought about by defendant's trespass. This point was stressed by Chief Judge Posner in Desnick v. American
BroadcastingCos., Inc., 46 a case involving an expos6 by ABC's PrimeTime
Live covering the shoddy medical practices of the plaintiff's eye clinics. But
the point seems odd because the tort of trespass is designed to protect the
owner's interest in the exclusive possession of his own land. One reason to
exclude an individual from property is to preserve the sense of privacy from
prying eyes that most individuals want. The use of a hidden camera by a
guest would be regarded as a serious offense even if the candid photographer
only showed the pictures to a close circle of friends. Publication to the world
makes the situation only worse. Both sets of damages should be seen as
parasitic on the original tort.47 It seems therefore wholly unsatisfactory to
exclude publication damages from the ordinary tort of trespass if it could be
established without question that the plaintiff would exclude the defendant
from entering the property if she had known the purpose of his visit:
Perhaps the ideas in this section can gain some coherence by an appeal to
the slippery ideal of reasonable expectations that continues to play so large a
role in the law of privacy. In the ordinary context of employment, it is com46. 44 F.3d 1345, 1352 (7th Cir. 1995). "There was no invasion in the present case of any of
the specific interests that the tort of trespass seeks to protect. The test patients entered offices that
were open to anyone expressing a desire for ophthalmic services and videotaped physicians engaged in professional, not personal, communications with strangers (the testers themselves)." The
offices were not open to anyone expressing a desire for ophthalmic services while concealing their
intention to broadcast scandal if they could find it.
47. See 1 STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 466-70 (1906). The use of parasitic
damages has been applied to allow for emotional distress that follows from a trespass. See generally Bouillon v. Laclede Gaslight Co., 129 S.W. 401,402 (Mo. App. 1910) (holding that employee
of gas company was liable for damages resulting from plaintiff's miscarriage after he frightened her
by trespassing on her premises).
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monplace for individuals to talk about their boss and each other within the
workplace and beyond it. But it is equally clear that the same social norms
that tolerate this extensive chit-chat frown mightily on the possibility that
workers would use surreptitious means to videotape the activities of their
fellow workers. It is, therefore, not surprising, that Desnick has been attacked for taking the uncompromising (and untenable) line that holds that the
common law of trespass is not meant to offer any protection against invasions of privacy, as these invasions are commonly understood.
Sanders v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc.,48 involved yet another
PrimeTime Live Broadcast in which an ABC employee used false pretense to
obtain work as an employee of a telepsychic company, allowing her to secretly videotape her conversations with plaintiff, a co-employee also working
as a telepsychic. Judge Werdegar was prepared to protect the privacy interest by drawing a line on how plaintiff's behavior was covered. Routine
comments and observation were allowable, as they have always been. But
from that humdrum premise, it hardly follows that videotaping and broadcast
could be undertaken as of right. Rather, Judge Werdegar explicitly rejected
the notion that privacy had a binary, all-or-nothing characteristic, and concluded that "in the workplace, as elsewhere, the reasonableness of a person's
expectation of visual and aural privacy depends not only on who might have
been able to observe the subject interaction, but on the identity of the
claimed intruder and the means of intrusion." Accordingly, "a person who
lacks a reasonable expectation of complete privacy in a conversation, because it could be seen and overheard by coworkers (but not the general public), may nevertheless have a claim for invasion of privacy by intrusion based
on a television reporter's covert videotaping of that conversation."49 Given
that sensible partition of the social space, Desnick was first frowned on and
then distinguished on the ground that Sanders was concerned "with interactions between coworkers rather than between a proprietor and a customer."50
But that line is thin. If the ordinary patient videotaped her session with her
physician and broadcast it live on television, there would be hell to pay, even
if the broadcast disclosed no physician wrongdoing. The means of invasion
matter in ways that the nature of the relationship do not. The short and simple truth is that the ordinary sense of right and wrong sees a hard and fast
line between what is seen and reported and what is seen and recorded. The
law should follow that instinct. The hard question here is not whether the
plaintiff has an interest that the law of trespass or privacy should protect.
48. 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1999).
49. Id. at77.
50. Id.
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She does. The hard question is what interest can be placed on the other side
of the balance.
B. JustificationofPublicationDamages
Closely allied with the cognizable hann defense is the notion that the
fraud could fall into the class of justified trespass or fraud. That class is not
empty and probably includes certain situations, for example, where the defendant does not reveal that he plans to build a manufacturing plant on the
farmland that he purchases.51 Posner uses different examples to make the
point in Desnick:
Without it a restaurant critic could not conceal his identity when he ordered a
meal, or a browser pretend to be interested in merchandise that he could not afford to buy. Dinner guests would be trespassers if they were false friends who
never would have been invited had the host known their true character, and a
consumer who in an effort to bargain down an automobile dealer falsely
claimed to be able to buy the same car elsewhere at a lower price would be a
trespasser in the dealer's showroom. Some of these might be classified as
privileged trespasses, designed to promote competition. Others might be
thought justified by some kind of implied consent-the restaurant critic for example might point by way of analogy to the use of the "fair use" defense by
book reviewers charged with copyright infringement and argue that the restaurant industry as a whole would be injured if restaurants could exclude critics.
But most such efforts at rationalization would be little better than evasions. The
fact is that consent to an entry is often given legal effect even though the entrant
has intentions that if known to the owner of the property would cause him for
perfectly understandable and generally ethical or at least lawful reasons to revoke his consent.5 2
Yet all of these examples are surely distinguishable from the issue of
publication damages that they are meant to bolster. The restaurant critic operates with a very different game plan than the investigative reporter. Only
the latter is consumed by selection bias. He enters multiple premises under
false pretenses, but the only information he will publish is that known to be
harmful to the plaintiff. That information, moreover, will be published in a
form calculated to score a knockout blow. Any story that vindicates the
plaintiffs practices ends up on the cutting room floor. The plaintiff, therefore, wants to exclude this party because her expected utility from his entry
is always negative.
Not so with the restaurant critic. If the critic's entry were made with the
knowing consent of the owner, a favorable story could be perceived by the
51. See Guaranty Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Liebold, 56 A.951 (Pa. 1904). For a discus-

sion ofjustified fraud, see EPSTEIN, TORTS, supra note 17, at 558.

52. Desnick v. American Broad. Cos., Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1351 (7th Cir. 1995).
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public as though the two parties were in cahoots, thereby diminishing its
value to the restaurant and the readers of the published review. The artificial
separation between parties is necessary to ensure impartiality, and the restaurant is protected in part because the reviewer knows that his readers want an
accurate account. Favorable accounts do not get left systematically on the
cutting room floor; therefore, the anticipated return to a well-run operation is
positive. Of course mistakes, sometimes deliberate, will be made, but once
again countermeasures are available. Multiple reviews are typically written
so that the extremes are buffered. Reviewers are typically identified by code
names so that the readers can correct for implicit biases. Protests to the
magazine or newspaper could lead to a second anonymous review. This redundancy operates in a fashion similar to that found with qualified privileges
in defamation. They protect both restaurants and their customers against undeserved outliers in either direction. Bad restaurants could still suffer from
candid reviews but they should be allowed to post conspicuous signs saying
"no reviewers allowed." However, that fact alone, which could be reported,
is enough to condemn all but the most well-established of restaurants. The
restaurant critic and the investigative reporter generate such different payoffs
as to fall into different worlds. The former promises an expectation of joint
gain, the latter does not.
The case of white lies is even easier to distinguish. These are practiced
by all against all, and help ease ordinary interactions. Their motive, moreover, is generally defensive: to avoid confrontation. It is not exploitative, for
its practitioner has no hope of benefiting financially from his own deliberate
misinformation. The practice functions as social glue on a live-and-let-live
basis that again works to the long-term advantage of all persons, which is
why it attracts so little moral condemnation.
Finally, the case of hard bargaining with false statements again involves
the usual conventions of social life. Each side can practice this deception
against the other, and it is known to be part of bargaining, in the same way
that bluffing is part of poker. The mere fact that stratagems of this sort are
practiced everyday, while only the hearty engage in the elaborate frauds of
PrimeTime Live, shows just how far apart these worlds are. PrimeTimeLive
will resort to a big league fraud to secure entry because of what it hopes to
gain, not by taking money out of the plaintiffs pocket, but by pocketing the
advertisement revenues generated off the backs of its victims. Hardball, yes;
hard bargaining, no.
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C. Remoteness ofDamages
Another line of defense at common law invokes the doctrine of remoteness of damages to insulate the defendant from liability. Just this approach
was taken by the District Court in Food Lion, where Judge Tilley wrote as
follows:
Food Lion's lost sales and profits were the direct result of diminished consumer
confidence in the store. While these losses occurred after the Prime Time Live
broadcast, the broadcast merely provided a forum for the public to learn of activities which had taken place in Food Lion stores. Stated another way, tortious
activities may have enabled access to store areas in which the public was not
allowed and the consequent opportunity to film people, equipment and events
from a perspective not available to the ordinary shopper, but it was the food
handling practices themselves-not the method by which they were recorded or
published-which caused the loss of consumer confidence. 53
This statement flies in the face of every single theory of proximate cause
in the history of tort law. The earliest and narrowest theory of proximate
cause is the "last wrongdoer" theory in which liability attaches to the last
wrongful act in the chain of events that created and produced the harm.5 4 In
this case, two possible candidates vie for that honor: The first is the improper food handling practices of Food Lion, and the second is the publication of that information after it has been obtained by deception and deliberate
trespass. By the last wrongdoer theory, the earlier conduct of Food Lion
drops out of the equation and the full harm is attributable to the publication
of information deceptively acquired.
This last wrongdoer theory has been universally rejected in modem
cases, all of which recognize that successive wrongful acts which in combination bring about some harm each count as a proximate cause of the injury
in question, so long as each counts as a "substantial factor" in bringing about
the harm.5 5 ABC's conduct counts as a proximate cause of the harm precisely because its conduct "enabled" the public to gain access to the private
areas in Food Lion's business. On the orthodox theory, both Food Lion and
ABC have sufficient causal connections to the harm in question, so that the
unresolved issue goes to the apportionment of harm between them. On this
score, the standard theory gives substantial weight to the deliberate wrongs
53. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 956, 962-63 (M.D.N.C. 1997).
54. For the last wrongdoer test, see THOMAS BEvEN, NEGLIGENCE IN LAw 44-50 (3d ed.
1908).

55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1977). To give but one example, in Mitchell
v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872 (Cal. 1991), it was held clear error to find for the defendant who slept on
the beach while children in his charge misbehaved on a raft, ultimately leading to the death of
plaintiff's son. The misconduct of the boys on the raft did not sever the causal connection to the
prior negligence.
HeinOnline -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1022 1999-2000

May 2000]

FIRSTAMENDMENTEXCEPTIONALISM

1023

of both parties. In this case, that might not prove decisive because, while
ABC's fraud was systematic and contrived, Food Lion's practices could be
treated as deliberate as well. But even here there is a further difference that
might be of some consequence. No evidence presented indicates that a
higher-up in Food Lion authorized any improper food handling practices.
The producers of PrimeTime Live themselves authorized the incursion. The
apportionment issues, as always, remain murky. That said, no causal doctrine could possibly treat the collection of the information and its subsequent
publication as causally unrelated to Food Lion's loss. Given this background, it is perhaps not surprising that the Fourth Circuit, in upholding
ABC's position, did not discuss the tort question but exclusively relied on the
First Amendment doctrines of freedom of speech to bar the recovery of publication damages.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT EXCEPTIONALISM IN ACTION
In order to assess the soundness of the constitutional issues, it is necessary to review the two rival accounts of the First Amendment outlined above.
The first of these, it will be recalled, does not offer the press any special immunization from tort liability, but only insists that special rules could not be
applied to the prejudice of speech. The second view is that the First
Amendment requires courts to craft special doctrines for publication damages. The former view applies to the press laws of general applicability, both
by statute and common law, just as they apply to nonmedia defendants. The
second view creates a First Amendment enclave for the benefit of the press.
The most important Supreme Court case to speak to this issue is Cohen
v. Cowles Media Co.56 The plaintiff, Cohen, worked for the Republican gubematorial candidate in the 1982 Minnesota election. He supplied to the
Minneapolis Star and Tribune information to the effect that the Democratic
gubernatorial candidate had previously faced criminal charges on two separate occasions. In exchange for the information, the Star and Tribune promised him source confidentiality. In violation of its confidentiality agreement,
the editorial board of the paper subsequently decided to reveal the plaintiff as
the source of its stories. On publication of the information, Cohen was fired
by his employer. He thereupon sued the defendant on a promissory estoppel
theory, which was treated as valid as a matter of state law. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the First Amendment protected the defendant from the liability associated with its breach of contract and the
plaintiff's dismissal. The argument in favor of that position is that the in56. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
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formation revealed was true and its publication contributed to the public debate. Nonetheless that contention was explicitly rejected by Justice White,
who adhered to his basic orientation in Gertz, when he previously opposed
refashioning the common law of libel to meet ostensible constitutional law
concerns.
In reaching that position, Justice White first rejected the contention that
this breach of contract situation was governed by earlier cases that countenanced the publication of truthful information lawfully obtained. Rather, he
held that the present case was governed "by the equally well-established line
of decisions holding that generally applicable laws do not offend the First
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news." 7 He then mentioned
a wide range of other restrictions on the press that stemmed from the application of the privacy law itself58 the National Labor Relations Act,59 and the
Fair Labor Standards Act.60 He also noted that the press enjoyed no exemption from the antitrust laws,6 1 nor from the payment of nondiscriminatory
taxes.6 2 The clear implication of this position was that the press could not
wiggle its way out of the general law of contract either.
Cohen is unsatisfactory insofar as it depends on the unanalyzed term "incidental" to discriminate between permissible and impermissible burdens on
speech. Justice White found the list of incidental restrictions coherent, given
that they had all passed muster in the modem regulatory state. His basic intellectual orientation thus brings together strange bedfellows in the class of
generally applicable laws. But his approach does not jell as a matter of general constitutional theory because the rationales behind the National Labor
Relations Act63 and the Fair Labor Standards Act64 are flatly antithetical to
those behind the privacy laws, the antitrust laws, or the basic norms of taxation. The two labor statutes are designed consciously to override the common law rules that allow for freedom of contract between employer and
employee in competitive labor markets, first by preventing the choice of
contracting partners and then by limiting the terms on which these contracts
57. Id. at 669.

58. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). This opinion, also
written by Justice White, concerned the breach of privacy that now goes on in the name of "right of
publicity."
59. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
60. See Oklahoma Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
61. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
62. Discriminatory taxes, however, may violate the First Amendment. See Minneapolis Star
& Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 US. 575 (1983).
63. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1935).
64. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1938).
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can be made. As an unreconstructed defender of Lochner v. New York,65 I
have no question that this limitation on employer choice constitutes a taking
of private property, a limitation on freedom of contract, or both combined,
which only passes constitutional muster today because of the Court's dubious but systematic embrace of the rational basis test. 66
A far higher standard of scrutiny is needed under current law, however,
to justify restrictions on freedom of speech than is needed to justify restraints
on freedom of contract. A statute that limits management's control over its
workforce will invite union organizations whose state-sanctioned economic
power can impair the press's flexibility to publish what it wants when it
wants to. For example, strikes disrupt publication and union opposition can
delay technical innovation that promises better publication at lower cost.
The net impact of the statutory restriction imposes a substantial inhibition on
speech without any showing that the inhibition serves any legitimate public
end.
The use of the word "incidental" thus imports something close to a rational basis test into those regulations that lie at the intersection of speech
and economic regulation. That approach is blocked by applying a unified
standard of review to both forms of regulation. Once that barrier is erased, it
then becomes child's play to declare these labor laws unconstitutional as applied to the press, given that they are (in theory) unconstitutional to all industrial enterprises. But lest one lapse into constitutional sentimentalism,
rules of this sort, as applied to the press, should be unconstitutional under
currentFirst Amendment standards, which impose a higher level of scrutiny
on the narrower category of speech-related cases. It seems quite idle to say
that restrictions on the labor inputs toward speech do not matter when direct
restrictions on publication do.
The application of this revitalized standard of protection for property and
contract plays out quite differently for the antitrust laws and nondiscriminatory (i.e., flat) taxes. To be sure, neither set of rules can be justified on the
strength of the basic common law prohibition against force and fraud. But
both can be defended as deviations from the common law rules that work to
the long-run advantage of all persons taken together, the former by eliminating the dangers of monopoly and the latter for the funding of core govemmental functions.67 It should not be forgotten that the same Supreme
65. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a maximum hours law on freedom of contract
grounds). Its progeny includeAdairv. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (striking down a federal
law which made it a crime to discharge an employee because of his union membership), and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
66. See, mg., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
67. See EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES, supranote 33, at 123-24, 138-39.
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Court that struck down maximum-hours legislation applied the antitrust laws
to territorial market divisions.6 8 Indeed Justice White should have gone further to note that the decision in Minneapolis Star & Tribune not only validated the flat use tax on inputs into newspapers, but it also invalidateda use
tax on the cost of paper and ink products consumed in the production of a
publication, here with an exemption for purchases below an annual $100,000
figure.69 The argument against the selective tax on the inputs for newspapers
is for reasons that are equally valid for taxes of general applicability.70 Any
revenue target can be reached through a flat tax, so there is no sensible justification for skewing the burden on one class of activities relative to another.71 Matters only became worse for the exemption that favored small
newspapers over large ones. 72 Differential taxation subsidizes some speakers
at the expense of others. Why take that risk at all? Overall improvements
through regulation are permissible under the First Amendment. Hence the
press should be required to pay the same real estate taxes for public services
as everyone else. But skewed outcomes from disproportionate taxes fall into
the wholly different class of suspect regulation.
The upshot is that Cohen is incorrect insofar as it treats all laws of general application as though they were cut from a common cloth, when both in
theory and practice they are not. But the revised version of the Cohen test
upholds against First Amendment challenge all laws of general applicability
that comply with the common law rules of property, contract, and tort. It
also upholds all rules, whether at common law or by statute, that bring about
some general social improvement from the common law baselines.73 Who
could ask for more? That revised standard removes the unfortunate need to
rely on the term "incidental" to determine which general rules apply and
which do not. But for these purposes, it is sufficient to note that any rules
that result in the enforcement of basic contractual obligations fall clearly on
68. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 228-229 (1899) (writing

for the Court, Justice Peckham noted that the idea of "liberty" did not reach these contracts in restraint of trade). Peckham, of course, wrote Lochner.
69. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
591 (1983).
70. "When the State imposes a generally applicable tax, there is little cause for concern. We
need not fear that a government will destroy a selected group of taxpayers by burdensome taxation
if it must impose the same burden on the rest of its constituency." Id. at 585.
71. The raising of revenue "cannot justify the special treatment of the press, for an alternative
means of achieving the same interest without raising concerns under the First Amendment is clearly
available: the State could raise the revenue by taxing businesses generally, avoiding the censorial

threat implicit in a tax that singles out the press." Id. at 586 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S.
252 (1982)).
72. See MinneapolisStar,460 U.S. at 591.
73. For development of this theme, see EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES, supra note 33, at 128-48.
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the common law side of the line, so that Cohen is covered by a class of allowable, generally applicable laws that is narrower than Cohen itself contemplates.
All this, however, is not to say that the plaintiff's cause of action in
Cohen is well conceived. But is it? Most obviously, the plaintiff acted in
breach of his duty of loyalty to his own employer by bringing the information about his employer's opponent to the attention of the press. Even if the
plaintiff had negotiated a term contract with his employer and the story was
never published, it seems likely that he still could have been dismissed for
cause. At this point, it looks as though the plaintiff and defendant were in
cahoots in some illegal, or at least improper, arrangement. If that is the case,
then perhaps the plaintiffs suit should be dismissed under the familiar rule
that no person has a cause of action when he participates on even terms in an
illegal transaction. But in at least some situations, a plaintiff similar to
Cohen could have delivered information to the press that did not violate his
own prior obligations. If the publication of his name could result in the loss
of employment or other forms of harm for wholly independent reasons, then
the media should be held responsible. So if we put the particulars of this
case aside, Cohen, rightly understood, now stands for the proposition that so
long as a plaintiff has a valid cause of action for breach of contract, then the
First Amendment does not bar his action for damages.
The early case law contains some statements that point in this direction.
In Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,74 the defendants were two reporters who, in
conjunction with the district attorney, hatched a scheme whereby they would
go to the plaintiffs home office, armed with secret cameras and microphones, to pose as patients seeking the plaintiffs odd treatments. When the
pictures and verbal accounts were published in Lie magazine, plaintiff recovered $1,000 in damages. The Court's decision was brief and to the point:
"The First Amendment has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity from torts or crimes committed during the course of newsgathering. The
First Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means into the precincts of another's home or office."75

74. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971). For other cases pointing the same way, see Le Mistral,Inc.
v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 61 A.D.2d 491, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1978) (rejecting First Amendment
defense to publication damages). The case is arguably distinguishable on the ground that this was a
physical trespass, entering with "cameras rolling," and thus not a case of entry by fraud. See also
Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768 (Wis. CtL App. 1980) (allowing publication damages that
flowed from reporter's trespass); Belluomo v. KAKE TV & Radio, Inc., 596 P.2d 832 (Kan. App.
2d 1979) (recoguizing the claim in principle, but not allowed in fact).
75. Dietentann,449 F.2d at 249.
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Dietemann was ignored in Food Lion, even though it foreshadowed the
contours of the First Amendment law under Cohen. In Food Lion, Judge
Michael was prepared to allow Food Lion to recover its $2 in damages for
the nominal trespass and fraud.76 The key question then is whether the
Cohen principle (even when suitably limited, as noted above) required the

recognition of publication damages of the sort that were allowed on a far
smaller scale in Dietemann.

Under Cohen, so long as the published information was unlawfully obtained, an action should lie for the full extent of Food Lion's economic loss.

Nonetheless, Judge Michael sidestepped Cohen by invoking the exceptionalist view of the First Amendment embodied in New York Times. His basic

contention was that Food Lion did not sue for defamation and thus conceded
the truth of the information that was published in the particular case. He then
concluded that its suit was an effort to bypass New York Times and "to re-

cover defamation-type damages under non-reputational tort claims, without
satisfying the stricter (First Amendment) standards of a defamation claim.
We believe that such an end-run around First Amendment strictures is foreclosed by Hustler."77 Hustler involved a suit in which the defendant por-

trayed the plaintiff engaged in fornication with his mother in an outhouse, a

76. Judge Michael also struck down the punitive damage award against ABC on the ground
that it rested on a claim for fraud that was invalid under state law. His position was that so long as
the two individual ABC employees, Dale and Barnett, were employed by Food Lion under a contract at will, no action for fraud would lie because Food Lion could always dismiss them. "[U]nder
the at-will doctrine it is unreasonable for either the employer or the employee to rely on any assumptions about the duration of employment." Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital CitiesIABC, Inc., 194
F.3d 505, 513 (4th Cir. 1999). His position completely misunderstands the operation of the at-will
contract, which only holds that an employer is free to fire a worker for good reason, bad reason, or
no reason at all, and which gives the employee the same right to quit. But so long as there is a risk
of interim harm while the employment lasts, then the employer should be entitled to have true information before making the initial decision on whether to fire or hire, given the costs of entering
into any losing contract. See id. at 525-56 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). The point gained salience
because Food Lion claimed damages for the costs of training the two ABC workers for jobs that
they did not intend to keep. Judge Michael held that these costs were not true losses because other
workers may quit at will even when they originally intended to stay. In so holding he confused the
odds ex ante with the results ex post. No employer would hire a worker who is certain to quit, even
though he would hire one (treachery to one side) who might quit. In the first case, the expected
value of the contract to the employer is always negative, so he will always reject it. In the second
case, the decision to hire depends on the cost of training, the probability of worker retention once
training is given, and the gains from employment for the duration of the employment contract.
Clearly, it makes sense to hire some workers under this scenario, even under a contract at will.
Judge Michael's blunder proved important in the case because the punitive damages attached to the
wrongful hiring, not the wrongful publication. When the fraud count disappeared, the punitive
damages disappeared as well. As a general theory, the correct result would have been to ignore the
training costs, and the ridiculous multiple for punitive damages, while recognizing publication
damages, for which punitive damages seem appropriate.
77. FoodLion, 194 F.3d at 522 (discussing Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)).
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portrayal that it, and everyone else, knew to be false.7S The Court refused
(incorrectly, in my view) to treat this as a defamation case because no one
was deceived by the falsity. The correct test under defamation, however, is
only whether the false statement exposes the plaintiff to hatred, contempt,
and ridicule, which this one surely does.79 It then held that the failed action
for defamation could not be rehabilitated as an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress in order to bypass the actual malice requirement of
New York Times. It relied heavily on the dubious slippery slope argument
that a successful suit against Hustler would invite similar suits against political cartoonists such as Thomas Nast.
The difficulties with both New York Times and Hustler are beside the
point here, for in neither case could the plaintiff show the illegal collection of
the information that was subsequently published. Nonetheless, Judge Michael held that Cohen did not apply because Cohen was:
not seeking damages for injury to his reputation or his state of mind. He sought
damages ... for breach of a promise that caused him to lose his job and lowered

his earning capacity. Thus, this is not a case like Hustler... where we held that
the constitutional libel standards apply to a claim alleging that the publication
of a parody was a state-law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.0
It is just at this juncture that the internal confusions in the Cohen decision burst out. First, the damages sought in Cohen were in fact publication
damages, even if they were not publication damages that resulted from a libel. To see why this is the case, note that all damages in defamation cases
necessarily result from publication and that these are classified as either general or special damages.8 In the former, the plaintiff does not specify the
individuals who were deterred from doing business with her in consequence
of the defendant's libel, but instead relies on sensible inferences that unfavorable information about the plaintiff will in fact deter unidentified individuals from doing business with her.82 The case resembles one for the loss
78. See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 46. Instead, it treated the case as though it were one for intentional infliction of emotional distress, which was then subject to a broad First Amendment privilege
that swallowed the tort with respect to cruel caricatures of public officials and public figures. Yet
this diversion does not explain why Hustlerwas not treated as a defamation case.
79. See Burton v. Crowell Publ'g Co., 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936), where Judge Learned Hand
allowed a defamation action for an inadvertent caricature of plaintiff that its audience knew to be
false.
80. Food Lion, 194 F.3d at 523 (quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671
(1991)).
8I. For a discussion of general and special damages, see EPSTEIN, TORTS, supra note 17,

§ 18.10.
82. For an excellent example, see Ellsworth v. Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Inc., 280
N.W. 879 (N.D. 1938) (holding that plaintiff had a cause of action for defamation when defendant's
rating system harmed plaintiff by causing him to lose business from unidentified nonrepeat custom-

ers).
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of goodwill (itself a form of reputation) where the specific customer contacts
are not identified. In many cases, the plaintiff in defamation actions is reduced to relying on these general damages because she cannot locate the individual third parties whose course of conduct has changed in response to the
adverse statements about her. But the entire chain of causation does not depend on the false nature of the statement-only on the fact that its publication is harmful to the plaintiff by inducing third parties to go elsewhere. The
same set of inferences on causation could also be raised in an invasion of
privacy case such as Dietemann or Food Lion. It is not important to identify
which persons stop being patrons of the plaintiff. It is enough to know that
some persons were so put off.
Nonetheless a plaintiff's right to collect general damages for reputational
harms does not preclude her from establishing special damages if she can
show the linkage between the defendant's defamatory statement to its intended target and the plaintiff.83 The simplest illustration is where the defamatory statement of the defendant causes a husband to abandon his wife.
The more specific line of proof does not, however, convert these publication
damages into something else, for clearly the loss of a specific association
(such as Cohen's loss of his job) was the direct result of the influence of the
publication on a single person. It is therefore wrong to say that Cohen did
not seek damages for loss of reputation that flowed from defendant's breach
of contract. The breach of contract was the publication of his name, which
led his employer to dismiss him. Cohen therefore is not distinguishable from
New York Times on the ground that the latter involves publication damages
while the former does not. It is distinguishable only for the reasons that
make the publication wrongful. The falsity of the statement triggers the action in defamation; the trespass or the breach of contract triggers it in Cohen,
Dietemann, and FoodLion. Of these two types of cases, the action for defamation is the easier to allow because the publication of false information
does nothing to advance the overall level of public debate. The action for the
publication of truthful information, wrongfully obtained, is more confused
because the social gain from publication has to be offset against the private
wrong. The question in cases like FoodLion is how is that offset best done.

83. The proof of causation can rely on a combination of general presumptions that lost volume is attributable to defendant's conduct or specific evidence of lost gains. See Bishop v. New
York Times Co., 135 N.E. 845 (N.Y. 1922). All forms of general evidence are of course subject to

rebuttal by showing how other causes could account for the loss in profits. See, e.g., Jones v. Westem & S. Life Ins. Co., 91 F.3d 1032, 1036 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting lost income claim based on
plaintiff's testimony that he could have had a high paying job); Touma v. St Mary's Bank, 712
A.2d 619, 622 (N.H. 1998) (rejecting award of special damages where decline in sales preceded
defendant's erroneous foreclosure notice).
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As noted earlier, within the law, truth and falsity create a fundamental
divide similar to that between aggression and consent. But the clarity of the
line in polar cases does nothing to eliminate the possibility of individual
cases falling close to the line. In the area of aggression, the defense of consent is often highly contested, most notably in cases of date or acquaintance
rape. An analogous difficulty arises in cases like Food Lion. As noted earlier, the investigative reporter will kill any story that reflects well on its target. It should therefore come as no surprise that this reporter will select and
cull information in a way that places its target in the most unfavorable light.
The photographs chosen to be published can catch the target with jowls sagging in mid-sentence; they can be shot at odd angles; they can be cropped so
as to show only parts of the face. Bits of dialogue can be taken out of context. Single instances that are not representative of the whole can be given
undue prominence in the overall setting.
This selective use of evidence is something that is rightly frowned on in
serious social science research. Suppose that an investigator who wants to
establish that rent control raises (or lowers) local rents runs twenty different
regressions, of which only one supports the desired conclusion. The publication of that one regression counts as a true statement, but accepted social
science procedures require, at a minimum, a disclosure of the number of the
regressions run that failed to establish the desired correlation. To state the
point in its most obvious form, the question of truth is not simply a matter of
whether certain isolated statements are true. The question is whether the
truth counts as a fair and accurate abridgment of the entire record. The law
of defamation has long been sensitive to this position, for the privilege of
record libel is not granted to persons who publish snippets of the truth. The
privilege is allowed only "if the report is accurate and complete or a fair
abridgement of the occurrence reported."84 The same concern arises in this
context and thus serves to distinguish Food Lion from Dietemann in ways
that make the former a more compelling case for relief. In the latter case,
there was no reason to think that the individual photographs and dialogues of
the plaintiff were not representative of his standard practices. But in Food
Lion, the bits of footage, represented as true depictions of the events that they
recorded, were not shown in any way to be representative of the practices of
Food Lion as a whole. The reporters may have goaded the employees into
participating in these practices. There was no effort to indicate the frequency
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 611 (1977) (concerning publication of a defamatory
matter in an official report or public meeting). Note that the privilege does not attach to reports of
closed meetings even if these are fair and accurate. The basic logic is that here the public is not
entitled to a report of what is going on in the first place, which thus precludes the publication of an
accurate report of information that the defendant knows to be false.
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of these occurrences at other Food Lion outlets, or to ask the question of
whether the same rate of failure took place at the stores of any of its competitors. Yet the entire social justification for the expos6 is to provide information that would allow consumers to make better-informed decisions about
the relative costs and benefits of shopping at different stores. Clearly this
publication fails that particular purpose.
At this point, the question arises whether the literal truth of any single
episode should count as "true" for purposes of the law of defamation and
privacy. If not, then in an important sense the exaggerated forms of reporting are more false than true, so that the boundary between defamation and
invasion of privacy is shifted in the wrong direction. As that is the case, one
could argue that all investigative reporting should be regarded as presumptively false (given the biased approach to its collection and dissemination) so
that, whatever the initial burden of production,5 the statements should be
treated as though they were false unless the defendant can show, by analogy
to the record libel privilege, that they constituted a fair and accurate abridgment of the true state of affairs.
It seems a virtual certainty that First Amendment exceptionalism will be
sufficient to block the courts from adopting this more expansive reading of
defamation. The change in position would bring within the net of defamation many slanted stories that were collected by lawful means as well (although these will, on average, prove far less potent). But for these purposes,
it is instructive to note how the downgrading of the truth requirement plays
into the larger debate over the recovery of publication damages for true
statements tortiously obtained. In light of the evident selection bias, truth is
no longer a unitary concept. If the most that the defendant can claim for the
statements published is a literal but consciously nonrepresentative truth, then
the size of the public benefit from the publication of "truthful" statements
shrinks or becomes negative. Stated otherwise, the great source of difficulty
with publication damages was whether the benefit to the public justified or
excused the large private harms inflicted on the plaintiff. But if the public
benefits shrink or evaporate, then that tension is no longer there. What is so
distressing about the current literalist view of truth is that it compounds the
difficulties in this area, so that the question of representativeness, which is
critical to the public value of the information published, is securely hidden
from public view. Too many cases of what should be called defamation are
now improperly reclassified as cases of invasion of privacy.

85. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (placing the burden of
proving falsehood on the plaintiff).
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V. INJ-UNCTIVE RELIEF AND PRIOR RESTRAINT

Thus far I have examined the question of whether or not publication
damages should be recovered for the publication of truthful information (of
all sorts) that was illegally obtained. But it is equally important to decide

what other remedies are available to the injured plaintiff to deal with information that has been illegally obtained. Here again we apply the basic insight of Cohen, that the press does not receive any special immunity with
regard to its own tortious conduct, to the question of what remedies should
be allowed to plaintiffs for admitted wrongs. The choice of remedies was
not on the table in Cohen because the publication of the confidential information had already taken place, precluding injunctive relief. But would injunctive relief be appropriate if Cohen had gotten wind, before publication,
of the Star and Tribune's willingness to spill the beans? Here again the best
analytical approach is to ignore the First Amendment entirely and to ask
whether injunctive relief is appropriate for breach of contract. The case
looks strong. The defendant's breach is surely deliberate, and its consequences hold out serious danger to the plaintiff.86 Not only is his position
with his current employer compromised, but his ability to obtain another position is placed in jeopardy as well. The difficulty in calculating these damages should count as a reason to allow the stronger form of equitable relief.
Finally, one could argue that injunctive relief actually strengthens the
ability of the press to acquire information in the long-run because it makes its
promises of source confidentiality credible. That credibility cannot be presumed if the press can break its promises with impunity.87 Therefore, the
release of source information works against the systematic collection and
dissemination of information in the long-run. By this analysis, a prior restraint on speech by contract seems to make good sense at common law, and
is sharply distinguishable from the case of prior restraint referred to by
Blackstone-to wit, state censorship, without prior consent by the media defendant. On this point of view, at least a respectable case can be made for
the proposition that the consistency between the common law and the First
Amendment covers not only the basic delineation of rights, but also the selection of remedy. Clearly the source of constraint should matter in any
overall analysis of the case; why then should it be ignored when the case is
considered on constitutional grounds? The basic theory that treats the First
86. Here I put aside the question, broached above, about whether all relief should be denied
because the plaintiff himself was in breach of loyalty to his own employer.
87. By way of comparison, see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), where Justice
White, in an opinion that surely anticipates Cohen, takes the position that the First Amendment does
not shield a reporter from giving grand jury testimony about information that he has acquired in
confidence. So long as the Constitution does not protect "the average citizen" from testifying before the grand jury about evidence received in confidence, then it does not protect the press either.
This position seems to make eminently good sense.
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Amendment as a bulwark against the incursions of the New Deal state is the
same theory that allows injunctive relief against the prospective publication
of information in breach of contract.
The next question is the extent to which the refurbished logic of Cohen
carries over to cases where the plaintiff seeks either damages or injunction
for the publication of information acquired not under contract, but by trespass. As a matter of common law theory, the case for injunctive relief seems
strong: The plaintiff was entitled to keep the defendant off his property in
the first place. There is no doubt that the press could not obtain an order that
allowed it to enter the plaintiffs premises, conditional on its willingness to
pay some damages for its incursion. It could be kept out, and the information accordingly suppressed. Why does the situation now change when a
defendant has acquired the information by wrongful means? In the case of
evidence that the government seizes unlawfully and without a warrant, the
exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment amounts to an injunction
against the use of the information.88 It is not the case that the government
can use the evidence to convict the defendant so long as it is prepared to pay
nominal damages for the trespass that it causes. The need to keep the state in
line supplies the justification for giving the windfall to the guilty as well as
the innocent plaintiff. Unless we wish to allow the defendant to gain some
advantage by virtue of his prior trespass, then the only proper response is to
allow the same injunctive relief after the information was seized as was
available before its seizure. So if the plaintiff can keep the investigative reporters off its premises, then it can demand back, as it were, the fruits of the
defendant's illegal search.
The ability to suppress the use of speech thus has the salutary effect of
reducing the number of violations that take place in the first place. But it
does not stop other forms of action needed to deter unlawful practices by
plaintiffs. For example, the investigators can still interview people who have
been on the plaintiff s premises so long as they are not subject to any obligation of confidentiality. Most importantly, the investigative reporters can turn
over incriminating evidence to public authorities, who can then obtain search
warrants on proof of probable cause to investigate the premises in question.89
It is perhaps notable, therefore, that the expos6 in Food Lion was not foi88. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (allowing suppression of evidence under the
Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures).
89. Nor should it be assumed that the presence of investigative reporters to some degree insulates public officials from ordinary liability. Just recently, in Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603
(1999), the Supreme Court held that United States Marshals, although entitled to a qualified immunity, could be held responsible for violating the Fourth Amendment guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures if they entered private premises with ride-along investigative reporters.
None of the ostensible First Amendment-like privileges diminished the potential liability, including
the need for good public relations and the need for accurate public reporting. Note that the reporters
themselves could not be sued under the Fourth Amendment since they were private parties.
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lowed by any public enforcement action against the company. This is evidence of the real magnitude of the harms (small) relative to those trumpeted
by the press. And finally, it has to be known that the alleged wrongs of the
company were really self-limiting: The sale of spoiled food could easily result in illness, whose publication then falls into the public domain. What
gain is there to any firm from selling produce that reeks when opened?
There is little to fear that the suppression of information illegally obtained
will lead to widespread evasions of elementary health and safety standards.
VI. TRADE SECRETS
The issues of publication damages and injunctive relief also arise in connection with the defendant's broadcast of the plaintiffs trade secrets, such as
happened most recently in the Ford case. Given all that has gone before, it
appears that this issue is perfectly straightforward. Plaintiffs are not allowed
to enjoin the publication of harmful statements when they are false: Afortior!, they should not be allowed to enjoin their publication when true. The
proposition, if taken literally, is one of tremendous breadth, for it would allow the publication not only of wrongfully obtained business trade secrets,
but also such sensitive personnel information as that contained in individual
medical records. Under the broad definitions of newsworthiness, these records could easily count as matters of public concern. Although the discussion that follows is directed primarily towards industrial secrets, its
implications cover these other areas with equal force. It would be a tragedy
if the lawless action of isolated individuals could, on First Amendment
grounds, be allowed to run roughshod o',er the complex contractual and
statutory accommodations that are needed in this area.
A moment's reflection on this point reveals the stark contrast between
the remedies sought in the trade secret cases and those sought in cases where
the plaintiff seeks to enjoin the publication of disparaging information about
its products or practices.90 The basic logic of the common law of trade secrets recognizes that private parties invest extensive sums of money in certain information that loses its value when published to the world at large.91
90. The point was indeed noted by Judge Posner in Desnick v. American Broad. Cos., Inc., 44
F.3d 1345, 1352 (7th Cir. 1995) ("And likewise if a competitor gained entry to a business firn's
premises posing as a customer but in fact hoping to steal the finn's trade secrets." (citing Rockwell
Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 178 (7th Cir. 1991))). Posner noted in Rockwell that "trade secret protection is an important part of intellectual property, a form of property that
is of growing importance to the competitiveness of American industry. ... The future of the nation
depends in no small part on the efficiency of industry, and the efficiency of industry depends in no
small pa rton the protection of intellectual property." Id. at 180.
91. For the general rationale for the protection of trade secrets, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 39 cmt a (1993).
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The protection of this form of intellectual property cannot take place through
the patent system, which requires publication of the invention, making it
known to all competitors. The inventors seek patent protection to preclude
others from making or marketing the same product. Without the patent, their
investment is at risk, for it is often child's play for a rival firm to discover the
chemical composition of a potent drug, or to reverse engineer some valuable
device. Since the value of these inventions lies in their sale to the public, no
system of trade secrets could ever work to keep this information private. The
patent system thus fills the gap and allows simultaneously for the public dissemination and the private production of the patented invention.
No one, however, is obliged to seek a patent; and for certain kinds of information (e.g., process patents), patenting carries serious risk to the patent
holder, who may not be able to discover whether other firms have used its
invention without authorization. A standard product may be made by any
number of different processes; the defendant that publishes a process patent
for a standard good would be hard-pressed to tell whether it has been used by
a rival. Better, therefore, to keep the information private so that rivals will
have to discover the same secrets in order to gain competitive parity. Trade
secrets thus offer no protection against independent invention. But by keeping the information private in the first place, they allow a firm to profit from
its investment when it is possible to market goods without disseminating information about the processes that allowed for their convenient, cheap, and
safe manufacture. Trade secrets, moreover, are not confined to manufacturing processes, but cover any other sort of information (e.g., marketing strategies, customers lists) that give a firm a competitive edge on its rival.92
In most cases the protection of trade secrets does not run a collision
course with the First Amendment. The usual case of industrial espionage is
not followed by widespread publication of the information so obtained.
Rather, the thief usually wishes to keep its theft private so as to avoid detection by the owner of the trade secret and to prevent the dissemination of that
trade secret to any other firms in the industry that have not developed or acquired it. Hence the widespread publication of a trade secret is, or at least
has been, a relatively uncommon event. For example, The Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition does not address the conflict between the,
protection of trade secrets by injunction and the First Amendment prohibition against prior restraints.93
92. The standard definition of a trade secret is found in id. § 39 (1993): "A trade secret is any
information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently
valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others."
93. See id. § 44 (detailing the elements, without explicit reference to the First Amendment).
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Nonetheless that conflict is squarely raised in such cases as Ford,94 in
which the defendant published information over his website about undeniable trade secrets received from (what were claimed to be) anonymous
sources. These trade secrets of Ford related to the quality of its engines, its
strategies relating to fuel economy and emissions control, its powertrain advances, and its agenda for confidential meetings-all of which landed in the
laps of its suppliers, dealers, and competitors. In some of these cases, the
trade secrets related to matters subject to the regulatory supervision of EPA
and other government agencies, and in other cases it related only to the business plans of the company. With respect to all these secrets, Ford's employment contracts flatly forbade the unauthorized dissemination of trade
secrets, and Lane was well aware of the restrictions that bound his anonymous sources. He decided to publish the trade secrets on his website to retaliate against Ford after a dispute about Lane's right to attend certain Ford
trade shows and to use either the Ford trade name or its Blue Oval trademark
on his website. Lane's defense against an injunction rests on the strong First
Amendment presumption against prior restraints, which runs headlong into
the standard injunctive remedy available for trade secret violations.95
The question is how best to think about these issues. Once again, the
correct analytical approach does not attach special weight to First Amendment claims in the effort to establish the optimal adjustment between the
competing interests. As between the two immediate parties to the dispute,
the full set of efficiency arguments opts strongly for the protection of trade
secrets, given their essential role in modem industry.96 The protection of
trade secrets goes back to the ancient insight that a system of property is necessary to make sure that those who sow shall also reap, lest there be no sowing at all. 97 With respect to tangible items, the exclusive possession of the
thing is secured by the ordinary rules of trespass. But information has the
distinctive attribute that it can be both retained and transferred at the same
time (which is why the thief who takes trade secrets restores the documents
containing them to their original place). The strong property-like protection
given to these trade secrets-trade secrets count as private property protected
under the Takings Clause98-reflects the obvious judgment that these secrets
94. 67 F. Supp.2d 745 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
§ 44 (1993).
96. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (holding that federal patent laws did not preempt state laws pertaining to trade secrets).
95. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

97. For judicial recognition of this point, see International News Sen. v. Associated Press,

248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918) (observing that one who takes the fruits of another's labor endeavors
to "reap where it has not sown... appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown").
98. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984). The decision represents the antithesis of constitutional exceptionalism because it starts from the premise that the ConHeinOnline -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1037 1999-2000
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will not be created, or if created, will not be as widely disseminated under an
obligation of confidence,99 if they can be taken by others for their private

use. The economic logic of the rule is thus clear: The transmission of the
trade secret under conditions of confidentiality allows for the more efficient

deployment of the resource without putting it into the hands of its competitors.
As a matter of common law, trade secrets are protected by both damage
actions and injunctions for all the conventional reasons.10 0 Injunctions themselves are not sufficient because they do not compensate the holder of a trade

secret for losses that result from its public disclosure. Damages are not sufficient for the usual reasons. Although it is known that trade secrets have
great value to the firm, it is highly difficult to calculate the losses attributable
to disclosure. The award of injunctive relief reduces the risk of undercompensation given the necessarily speculative nature of the damages. Likewise,

a defendant (as in Ford) does not have the financial resources to answer for
his losses. The combination of remedies reflects the legal policy that all
available guns should be turned on a potential defendant. The weakness of
these legal remedies, however, means that firms use immense amounts of
care to regulate the distribution of trade secrets within the firm, lest they be

lost by inadvertent publication or simple theft. No one claims that this system is perfect; but no one seriously thinks that the regime can work as well if

damages, injunctive relief, or self-help are removed from the mix of measures available to secure trade secrets.

The policies outlined above do not only represent common law attitudes
on the subject; they also represent legislative policy at both the state and na-

stitution does not create property rights, but protects those which are created under state law. See
id. at 1001. It then promptly relies on the definition of trade secrets used in the RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 757 (1934) to define the scope of the property right protected under the Fifth Amendment.
See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1001-03. The one weakness in the decision is that it never quite
makes clear whether the property protection for trade secrets is lost if the government gives its
owner notice that the trade secret (here a chemical formula) must be registered in order for it to be
sold. See id. at 1006. In such a case the protection is largely illusory, since notice can be so easily
given, or, in what seems the right view of the case, that the trade secret can be registered and disclosed because the scheme in question offers just compensation for the loss of the relevant property
right.
99. The holder of a trade secret does not lose his property right because he shares it with employees or other persons in confidence. See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 475 ("The subject of a trade
secret must be secret, and must not be of public knowledge or of a general knowledge in the trade
or business. This necessary element of secrecy is not lost, however, if the holder of the trade secret
reveals the trade secret to another 'in confidence, and under an implied obligation not to use or
disclose it."' (citations omitted)).
100. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 44, 45 (1993) (outlining injunctions and monetary relief, respectively).
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tional level. The Uniform Trade Secrets Actl01 takes a hard line against the

"misappropriation" of any trade secret, which is defined to cover any acquisition of that trade secret by improper means, including "theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach, or inducement of breach of a duty to maintain secrecy
or espionage through electronic or any other means."10 2 The duty to respect
trade secrets is imposed not only on the person who takes the secret, but on
any person who acquires the secret with knowledge that his transferor had

improperly acquired it.103
These provisions key their operation to the rules governing the receipt of
stolen or misappropriated land or chattels. Neither the thief, nor the subse-

quent purchaser with notice, could prevail in a contest with the original
owner of the goods. Good faith purchasers might be entitled to protection,
but bad faith purchasers-that is those with notice-were not.104 That position had already been adopted with respect to service contracts in the tort of
inducement of breach of contract, such that the inducer with notice of the

prior contract could be enjoined from enforcing his contract with a person
already under obligation to the plaintiff.105 Once trade secrets are accorded
the protection of property, they receive the same level of protection as tangible objects and service contracts.
This same attitude toward protection is found in the Economic Espionage
Act of 1996,106 which in many particulars tracks the Uniform Trade Secret
Act by covering all cases of trade secret misappropriation: theft, copying,

and receiving or purchasing information with notice of its prior misappro101. As contained in the Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 445.1901-1910 (West, WESTLAW through 1999 Sess.).
102. Id. § 445.1902(a)-(b).
103. Id. § 445.1902(b)(ii) applies to one who discloses or uses a trade secret of another without consent if he or she:
(B) At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his or her knowledge of
the trade secret was derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it, acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its
use, or derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person to maintain its secrecy
or limit its use.
104. For a discussion of the problem, see JAMES E. DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 615-717 (4thed. 1998) (land and recordation). For chattels, see U.C.C. § 2-403 (1989).
105. See, eg., Lumley v. Gye, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853). For development of the notice
theme in the case, see Richard A. Epstein, Inducement ofBreach ofContract as a Problem of Ostensible Ownership, 16 3. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1987). For the dominance of injunctive relief, see
Fred S. McChesney, Tortious Interference with Contract Versus "Efficient" Breach: Theory and
EmpiricalEvidence, 28 1 LEGAL STUD. 131, 169-70 (1999). For a general overview of the tort, see
EPSTEIN, TORTS, supranote 17, §§ 21.2-21.5.
106. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-32 (1996). Section 1831 deals with Economic Espionage to foreign
governments and their instrumentalities. Section 1832 deals with the theft of trade secrets generally.
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priation.l07 In addition to the heavy criminal penalties authorized under the

Act, the Attorney General is entitled to use civil proceedings to obtain injunctive relief.l08
It is quite clear that the political climate is far more favorable to the protection of trade secrets than it is toward the suppression of unfavorable sto-

ries published about firms through unlawful methods, and for good reason.
To revert back to our earlier paradigm, no one thinks that the systematic misappropriation of trade secrets makes sense as between the two immediate
parties to a dispute. The gains to the appropriator of the trade secret are
similar to the gains to the thief of ordinary property. Although these should

be taken into account in the social calculus, they are more than offset by the
losses to the original owner, and their negative system-wide effect: the re-

duction of the willingness to invest in trade secrets in the first place. The
question, then, is whether the net losses as between the immediate parties are
offset by some new source of gain-that is, gain to the public from the publication of the information. Here the basic claim seems vanishingly weak because the public loses when the goods and services that it purchases are made
less efficient by the systematic misappropriation of trade secrets. As in the

case of private appropriation, the short-term gain from learning the information is more than offset by the realization that future supplies of information
will not be created precisely because the publication of that information
quickly converts private into common property.

107. See id. § 1832(a):
(a) Whoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to or included in a product that
is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce, to the economic benefit of anyone
other than the owner thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will, injure any owner
ofthat trade secret, knowingly(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or conceals, or by
fraud, artifice, or deception obtains such information;
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, downloads,
uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys such information;
(3) receives, buys, or possesses such information, knowing the same to have been stolen
or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization;
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in paragraphs (1) through (3); or
(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense described in paragraphs (I) through (3), and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of
the conspiracy,
shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than 10 years, or both.
(b) Any organization that commits any offense described in subsection (a) shall be fined not
more than $5,000,000.
108. Seeid. § 1836(a).
HeinOnline -- 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1040 1999-2000

May 2000)

FIRSTAMENDMENTEXCEPTIONALISM

1041

The question then arises, should all trade secrets be treated alike? One
possible way to break down this question is to argue that the possession and
use of some trade secrets is harmful in nature because it allows their holders
to circumvent environmental regulations or to commit other forms of illegal
actions. Stage one of the argument is that some trade secrets are no different
from the sloppy practices disclosed in Dietemann, Desnick, and Food Lion.
Stage two of the argument says that it is impossible to decide in advance
which trade secrets fall into this category, so that the only safe route is to
allow for the routine public disclosure of trade secrets. Injunctive relief and
perhaps damages would be inappropriate in cases of public disclosure, even
if they remain proper in the traditional cases of commercial espionage.
Yet here again the same counterarguments apply, only more so, to this
case. The private harms that are suffered under this approach remain enormous, while other means are available to be sure that environmental and
other interests are fully protected. Thus the EPA has the ability to examine
the finished products put out by automotive manufacturers, and a raft of
public health agencies could examine the various flavorings and additives to
cigarettes to determine if they contain harmful materials. In dealing with the
trade secrets of regulated firms, the Trade Secrets Act09 imposes stiff penalties on any government employee who discloses, in a manner not authorized
by law, any information that he acquires in the course of his official dutiesa prohibition that covers both informal "leaks" by government employees,
and releases by formal agency action.110 The administrative state is thus
well-equipped to seek out the negative spillovers from certain trade secrets
because across-the-board disclosure of these secrets generates enormous social costs for few social benefits. The common law rules on trade secrets, the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and the Economic Espionage Act all make good
sense and good social policy.
The same point can be seen if one compares the treatment of trade secrets to other forms of property and conduct that might fall under the First
Amendment. The copyright law is an artifact of congressional action, yet it
is routinely held that injunctions will issue against the publication of copyrighted material which is not protected under the fair use exception."]
Likewise, the plaintiff obtained injunctive relief against the misappropriation
of its stories in the fabled case of InternationalNews Service v. Associated
109. Id. § 1905.
110. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1008 (1984); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
441 U.S. 281, 298-301 (1979) (holding that § 1905 does not address formal agency action).
I11. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985)
(holding that the First Amendment does not create an exception to the "fair use" copyright doctrine
when a public figure's manuscript is at issue).
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Press,'12 even though the restrictions were directed to media defendants in an
era, of course, when the First Amendment did not intrude much into disputes
regulated by the private law. The same result is adhered to when injunctive
relief is routinely granted against the publication of the plaintiff's use or
likeness, whether by media or non-media defendants.113 In each of these
cases the basic position is the same: The injunction is granted insofar as it is
needed to secure the creation of the valuable information in the first instance.
But it is not granted with respect to speech that passes into the ordinary discourse of the land. Thus the injunctive relief afforded in INS lasts at most a
single day, until the next news cycle. The protection of a name or likeness
typically runs only to commercial use. It does not prevent political or social
commentary that refers, however critically, to those individuals who retain
the exclusive right of publicity over their own names.' 14
This equilibrium seems perfectly stable-stable, that is, until First
Amendment exceptionalism rears its head. Thus in dealing with the plaintiffs request for injunctive relief in Ford,Judge Edmunds concluded that in
the "clash" between the First Amendment and the conventional law of trade
secrets, "the battle is won by the First Amendment."115 This result is
achieved by starting with the general First Amendment prohibition against
prior restraint and carrying it over to an area where it should have no application at all. The origin of this presumption goes back to the early cases of
libel, such as Near v. Minnesota,' 6 which is read to state the basic rule that
prior restraints are allowed only in "exceptional cases," 1 7 with the result that
they are allowed only in the "most compelling circumstances."tl8 The usual
explanation is that the use of prior restraint will necessarily invite a system of
censorship, with all the dangers to current debate that this involves.
As noted earlier, the common law also declined to issue injunctions in libel cases, and for good reason. In that context, the line between libel and
harsh criticism is hard to discern, so that injunctive relief would prevent a
speaker from advancing to the public his views on the matter at hand. The
point has especial power when the audience has access to information from
112. 248 U.S. 215,232,246 (1918) (upholding the circuit court's award of"an injunction also
against any bodily taking of the words or substance of complainants news until its commercial
value as news had passed away").
113. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAWv §§ 50,51 (McKinney 1909). Section 51 authorizes the

injunctive relief.
114. For a discussion of the limits of such protection, see White v. Samsung Electronics
America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
115. Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp.2d 745,746 (1999).
116. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
117. Id. at716.
118. In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1351 (1st Cir. 1986).
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other sources about the target of the defamation, which is why this form of
defamation is rightly held not to be actionable at all. 19 In addition, in heated
political contests, the partial remedy of counter-speech is available to those
parties who are, or think themselves, defamed.120 The speaker, therefore, has
to pay a price for entering into the lists knowing that he will be unable to
enjoin or even sue his critics for their attacks on him.
Whatever the merits of these arguments, they simply do not carry the
same weight for trade secrets. Most obviously, counterspeech has no role
whatsoever to play in trade secret cases: Once the information is made public, then all competitors will have access to it. The denunciation of the
source of the leak may sully the source's reputation, but it will do nothing to
restore the trade secret in question. Nor will it allow the holder of that secret
to discover which rivals have taken advantage of his trade secrets once the
information is publicly released, much less obtain damages for the loss. The
lack of self-help remedies in trade secret cases requires that far greater stress
be placed on securing legal remedies, including, most critically, injunctive
relief.
Looking at the matter from the public's side, suppression of the publication of trade secrets can only with great difficulty be described as censorship
of political debate. The suppression of the publication of stolen information
does nothing to hamper the critic from denouncing any firm that chooses to
preserve its trade secrets, or to chide any government agency for its lackluster enforcement of the general law. It is something of a mystery as to how
free and open debate is frustrated by offering property protection to trade
secrets. Perhaps in some extreme case the publication of this information
could be regarded as essential to the health and security of the nation, but, if
so, then some particularized showing should be made before the injunction is
denied-the reverse of the current legal regime. Yet in the one case that addresses this matter, CBS Inc. v. Davis,'2 ' Justice Blackmun, on circuit, mechanically applied the earlier precedents to deny an injunction against the
broadcast of trade secrets, without requiring any particular showing of public

119. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A (1977) (noting limited liability to
members of large groups). For a general discussion, see EPSTEIN, TORTS, supra note 17, at § 18.6
(explaining that one rationale for exempting statements about large groups from libel injunctions is
the broad availability of accurate information about that group).
120. See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.L, concurring) (defending the application of the New York T7imes actual malice rule to public figures and noting:
"surely as a class these 'public figures' have as ready access as 'public officials' to mass media of
communication, both to influence policy and to counter criticism of their views and activities").
121. 510U.S. 1315 (1994).
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need.122 It hardly makes sense to rely on the presumption imported from the
defamation cases to matters in which the basic considerations are so different. Here the private interests against disclosure seem manifestly to outweigh the public interest for disclosure.
Yet the courts seem to be oblivious to these differences in making the
transition from defamation to trade secret cases. One key stage in the
movement is the so-called Pentagon Papers case, 2 3 where the Supreme
Court refused to enjoin the publication of a classified study, "History of U.S.
Decision-Making Process on Vietnam Policy," which had been illegally
leaked to the press by Daniel Ellsberg, then a Pentagon official. The refusal
to issue the injunction rested on the broad judicial presumption against prior
restraint.24 To Justices Black and Douglas, the only question was whether
an injunction should issue against the publication of "news," a formulation of
the problem that effectively conceals the illegal source of the leak on the one
hand or the sensitivity of the published information on the other.12S Justice
Brennan's somewhat more cautious opinion noted that "there is a single, extremely narrow class of cases in which the First Amendment's ban on prior
judicial restraint may be overridden." 26 When "at war," "[n]o one would
question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or the
number and location of troops."127 From my point of view, that concession
is too narrow for the reasons developed above. The government has the
same right as private parties to classify information. If the material that it
wishes to keep secret qualifies under the general trade secret laws, then like
any private party it has the right to injunctive relief to prevent that information from slipping into hostile hands.
What sense is there to a regime that allows the imposition of criminal
sanctions on those who leak the information, but does not allow the plaintiff
to keep the information quiet? Under the current regime, government opera122. See id. at 1317. Note that the trade secrets involved in this case, the daily operation of a
plant charged with having unsanitary practices throughout the meat industry, raises the kind of
health issues that were present in FoodLion but absent in Ford. Note also that Justice Blaclanun
was reluctant to award injunctive relief for speculative harms. See Davis, 510 U.S. at 1318. Yet
ironically, it is precisely the difficulty in estimating damages after the fact that makes injunctive
relief attractive to the private lawyer.
123. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
124. See id. at714.
125. See id. at 715 (Black, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring).
127. Id. (quoting from Near,283 U.S. at 716). Something less than this might suffice today
after Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), which did allow the restraint pursuant to contract
on matters that pertained to national security. But again the analysis was limited to classified materials relating to national security only.
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tions take the form of a kind of Hobbesian struggle where the government's
ability to keep its own secrets depends on the happenstance of whether it can
snuff out the illegal release of information by threatening government employees with dismissal, fines, and punishment beforehand. Perhaps some
official procedure should be created to check whether government classifications meet the requirements of trade secret law. However that question is
resolved, it seems indefensible that the New York Times, or any other publication that knows it is in receipt of stolen information should be able to publish it with impunity.
Yet let us suppose that the decision in the PentagonPaperscase is correct: It hardly seems to lead to the result that the holder of any trade secret is
powerless to enjoin their publication either by its employees or by a third
party to whom they were transferred. One possible justification for the outcome in the Pentagon Papers case is that the government could not be
trusted to look after itself, so that leaks should be encouraged to facilitate
public scrutiny of government by the press. This point seems dubious given
the intensive criticism of the Vietnam War inside and outside the government, virtually all of which fell within the core protection of the First
Amendment under any interpretation. The national security claims, on the
other hand, especially as they relate to sensitive information about troop
movements and the like, seem to cut in the opposite direction. Be this as it
may, judged by the heady stakes in the Pentagon Papers case, the interests
on both sides of the trade secret issue count for less. The national security
claims are gone and this should reduce the size of the conflict. In addition,
the clear sense that orderly government procedures can review trade secrets
without compromising confidentiality suggests that the misguided Pentagon
Paperscase should not be extended beyond its national security toehold into
the ordinary operations of the legal system.
The Pentagon Papers case, however, represents only one landmark in
this area. Several other cases should be briefly mentioned. In Landmark
Communications,Inc. v. Virginia,128 the Court refused to impose the obligations of confidentiality on a newspaper that had obtained information about
proceedings on judicial disability and misconduct, noting the First Amendment issues at stake. In the earlier case of Pearson v. Dodd,129 the D.C. Circuit held that the two defendant columnists were entitled to publish
information that they knew had been improperly leaked to them by members
of Senator Dodd's staff. The defendants had not procured the copying of the
documents, but had only received the information with the knowledge that it
128. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
129. 410 F.2d. 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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was stolen-a point that impressed itself on the court.t 30 Once again, it
seems like a distinction without a difference. As both the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act and the Economic Espionage Act held, knowing receipt of stolen
information is sufficient to subject the defendant to liability. 31 As before,
the publication of the information should not be treated as a wrong separate
and apart from the collection of the information. The entire edifice of property protection is wholly undermined if the transferee is allowed to obtain

rights against the original owner that were not possessed by the transferor.
Nemo dat quod non habet--one is not able to convey what he does not

have-is a conventional maxim of property law that applies, undiminished,
to transferees with notice of the prior wrong. Landmark Communications
and Pearson represent a form of First Amendment exceptionalism that is
better rejected than imitated.

The last class of cases that requires brief mention includes those in which
a party receives information pursuant to litigation that it publishes in violation of the conditions of confidentiality under which it was obtained. Thus in
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,132 the Supreme Court held that the petitioner

newspaper could not publish information that it had received in discovery
which had been made subject to a protective order, with an exception for information that was otherwise obtainable.133 Once again the logic seems unassailable; the sharing of information for discovery would be heavily

burdened if the disclosures could not be limited to the purposes of litigation.
And given the risk of Pearson,it hardly seems sensible that a party that obtains information under a protective order should be able to slip out from
under the restriction by its selective transfer to a third party. 34

130. See id. at 705.
131. See Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.1902(b)(ii)
(West, WESTLAW through 1999 Sess.). See also Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §
1832 (a) (1996).
132. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
133. See id. at 31-32.
134. On which see, LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; 966 n.6 (1988).
"[1]t may well be that government must also be conceded the authority to punish those who illegally
obtain access-although perhaps not those third parties who innocently obtain such illegally acquired information and thereafter disseminate it." Note that earlier in the same footnote, Tribe
engages in First Amendment exceptionalism by arguing that the distinction between "lawfully" and
"unlawfully obtained" information may function as a "talisman" that "may in part beg the access
issue ... since the question of 'what is lawful?' cannot be answered without reference to the first
amendment." But the opposite approach seems better. In order to understand the scope of the First
Amendment, it is necessary to have a general theory, consistent with the basic norms of freedom,
that explains what activities are lawful and what are not.
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CONCLUSION

It is one of the great ironies of any legal system that disclosure of information is regarded, and rightly so, as both one of the highest goods and
greatest evils. In so many contexts, it is rightly said that full disclosure is
needed in order to expose dangerous conflicts of interests or to allow individuals to make full and informed decisions on matters of great importance
to both them and the nation at large. Yet by the same token, we also recognize that the success of both personal and business endeavors depends on our
ability to respect confidences and to keep private information private. In
most cases the two imperatives operate at opposite ends of the legal spectrum
so that their inconsistent commands do not come into evident tension with
each other. But legal principles also follow the usual territorial imperatives,
and, at the hands of skilled advocates, are aggressively pressed into service
across the board. It should, therefore, surprise no one that the disclosure
norm and the privacy norm often run on a collision course with respect to
information that has value to some if it is kept secret, and to others if it is
disclosed. There is no way to paper over these conflicts in order to pretend
that either one interest or the other should have full sway.
In this paper, I have sought to take into account the full range of interests, pro and con, that follow from the disclosure of information to the detriment of those who wish to keep it private. The simplest line here seems to
offer the best resolution of that conflict: Where true information is lawfully
obtained, it can be circulated regardless of the consequences to those who
wish to keep it private. Where true information is obtained illegallywhether by trespass, fraud, or breach of confidence or contract-the
presumption should shift sharply in the other direction, so that both damages
and injunctive relief are made available to the party with the right to keep
that information confidential. The arguments made here are perfectly
consistent with a view of the First Amendment that finds that the freedom of
speech, while entitled to full constitutional protection, is subject to the same
limitations as any other freedom, whether freedom of action or of contract.
But they will not survive the dominant form of First Amendment
exceptionalism by which courts take it upon themselves to set out novel rules
for the protection of speech that deviate sharply and consciously from
common law rules, and do so to the detriment of us all.
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